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NOTES
A NEW APPROACH TO AN ENTERTAINER'S
RIGHT OF PERFORMANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Act of 1976' protects authors' writings embodied in
tangible form whether or not they are published.2 The Act does not
encompass performing artists' rights in unrecorded, live performances.
3
Accordingly, performers must resort to state law for protection of aes-
thetic and commercial performance interests. Present state law, how-
ever, inadequately protects against unauthorized appropriation of live
performances.
One major problem in obtaining state law protection of perform-
ances is the lack of a universally recognized definition of a protectible
performance.4 Courts find that various elements compose a perform-
ance. The expression of the performer's style is the heart of a perform-
ance.5 The style may be the use of a certain characterization or the way
one sings or acts. It may range from a concrete identification of a per-
former with certain dress or mannerisms 6 to a more elusive situation in
which there is no identification of the style with any type of character at
all. 7 The author must express the style in a performance because the
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. III 1979).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. III 1979).
3. Creative works not fixed in any tangible medium of expression are not "writings" within
the scope of the Act. I M. NIMMER, NimMER ON COPYwRHT § 1.08[C][2] (1981); see notes 25-52
infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 6-11 infra and accompanying text.
5. "The individual performance ... is the expression of the style/idea. It is that perform-
ance which is the property to which legal rights must attach to protect the performing artist, not
the style of delivery." Lang, Performance andthe Right of the Performing Artist, 21 ASCAP Copy-
RIGHT L. SymP. 69, 95 (1974). See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,217 (1954); Holmes v. Hurst,
174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899); Welles v. CBS, 308 F.2d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 1962); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note
3, § 1.01[B][2][C]; Note, An Author'rArtisticReputation Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 1490, 1507 (1979).
6. See, ag., Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., No. 80-2310, slip op. at 4
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1981); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (D.N.J. 1981); Chap-
lin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 362, 269 P. 544, 545 (1928).
7. Note, Intellectual Propertyx-Performer's Style-A Quest for Ascertainment, Recognition,
andProtection, 52 DEN. LJ. 561, 566-68 (1975). See, e.g., Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256
(lst Cir. 1962).
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style or character as an ideal is not protectible against imitation alone.9
Thus, the performance is the particular rendition of a song or character
that expresses the performer's style.' ° The Copyright Act of 1976 does
not protect this performance unless it is fixed in a tangible form such as
on recordings or films. I
Given such a generalized definition of performance, the adequacy of
state law is best examined in light of the performance interests the per-
8. Lang, supra note 5, at 72-73; Raskin, Copyright Protectionfor Fictional Characters 2 PER-
FORMING ARTS REV. 587, 590 (197 1). See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274
F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). Cf. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930)
(copyright protection of playwright's property not extended to ideas).
In the analogous area of the copyrightability of fictional characters, courts distinguish between
the cartoon character and the literary character. Cartoon characters are protectible under copy-
right as a part of the work in which they appear. A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW: HOWELL'S
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISED AND THE 1976 AcT 39 (1979); Brylawski, Protection of Characters-
Sam Spade Revisited, 22 COPYRIGHT BULL. 77, 84 (1974). See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates.
581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978); Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications, Inc., 111 F.2d 432 (2d
Cir. 1940); Fleischer v. Freundlich, 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934); King Features Syndicate v.
Fleiseher, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924); Detective Comics, Inc. v. Fox Publications, Inc., 46 F. Supp.
872 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). Literary characters, on the other hand, are not normally copyrightable be-
cause they may exist independent of the particular work in which they are expressed. Comment,
Characters and the Copyright Clause-Is a Character a Writing, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 222, 228
(1974). But ci. CBS v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967) (although character of "Palladin"
copyrightable, though not expressed in any particular work, copyright protection denied because
character not registered), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967). See also note 150 infra. The author's
rights in the character are protected by common law. Brylawski, supra, at 84-87. Thus, the author
may use characters in subsequent work. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 216 F.2d 945
(9th Cir. 1954).
9. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 1970); Booth v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Davis v. TWA, 297 F. Supp. 1145,
1147 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Lang, supra note 5, at 93.
Futhermore, protection of a specific style may hinder another performer's ability to use the
popular style to gain his own recognition. Liebig, Style and Performance, 17 COPYRIGHT BULL.
40,46 (1969). Butsee Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., No. 80-2310 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
5, 1981); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
10. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970); Booth v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 352 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Davis v. TWA, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D.
Cal. 1969); Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.C. 1939); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting
Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).
11. "A work is not 'fixed' under the Copyright Act unless its embodiment in tangible form is
'sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communi-
cated for a period of more than transitory duration'." 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.03 [B][2]
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. III 1979) (Copyright Act of 1976)). See notes 25-33 & 36-41 infra
and accompanying text.
Prior to 1972, copyright laws did not protect phonograph records from piracy. However, the
passage of Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) protected recordings copyrighted after that year.
The Supreme Court upheld state statutes protecting records and tapes from piracy if made before
1972 in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). The 1976 Copyright Act further elaborated
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former desires to protect. A performer has both intangible and com-
mercial interests in his performance. The performer's basic intangible
interest is reputation.' 2 Reputation is attained by developing, through
expenditures of time, skill, and money, a style, unique rendition, or
character to which the public gives special recognition. Courts are un-
willing, however, to protect creators' interests in their reputations
alone-their "moral rights."' 3 This unwillingness is not fatal, however,
because the performer's reputation interest largely depends on the mar-
ketability of his performances. The result is a merger of the intangible
and commercial interests. Effective protection of commercial interests
will correspondingly enhance intangible interests.
A performer's success depends upon his ability to exploit commer-
the protection afforded. See generally Note, Performers" Rights Under the General Revision of the
Copyright Law, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 766 (1978).
Protection of expression under the Copyright Act is also subject to the fair use doctrine. "Fair
use is the privilege accorded others to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner with-
out the proprietor's consent." Note, supra note 7, at 74. The fair use defense is regularly claimed
in cases of parody, satire, and mimicry. These latter art forms use the copyrighted work to de-
velop original works. See, e.g., Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980); Green v.
Minzensheimer, 177 F. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1905); Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 F. 977 (E.D. Pa.
1903). See generally Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYM'. 43
(1955); Light, Parod; Burlesque, and the Economic Rationalefor Copyright, 1 I CONN. L. REV. 615
(1979); Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry and Humorous Commentary, 35
S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1962); Wyckoff, Defenses Peculiar to Actions Based on Infringement of Musi-
cal Copyrights, 5 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 256 (1954).
For an exhaustive discussion of fair use under the Copyright Act of 1976, see Seltzer, Exemp-
tions and Fair Use in Copyright: The Exclusive Rights Tension in the New CopyrightAct, 24 Copy-
RIGHT BULL. 215 (1977).
12. Once an artistic reputation is developed, the performer may exploit it through commer-
cial endorsements and guest appearances. See notes 98-101 infra and accompanying text. See
generally Note, supra note 5. See also Note, An Artist's Personal Rights in his Creative Works:
Beyond the Human Cannonball & the Flying Circus, 9 PAc. L.J. 855 (1979).
13. The "moral right" is the right of an author to "claim recognition of his work, the right to
prevent false attribution of his name to another's work, and the right to prevent objectionable
alterations of his work." Note, supra note 5, at 1492.
This "moral right" is recognized in the civil law and under the Berne Convention. Berne Con-
vention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act of July 24, 1971, Art. 6, re-
printed in A. LATMAN, supra note 8, at 486. It is a right that an author receives in addition to
copyright protection. An author's "moral right" is not recognized in the United States. Note, The
Question of Berne Entry for the United States, 11 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 421, 428 (1979). See
Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
The "moral right" protection is analogous to the protection performers seek for their interests in
their reputation. It is a protection of personality and satisfies an author's desire to safeguard the
goodwill his name connotes. See generally Diamond, Legal Protection for the "Moral Rights" of
Authors and Other Creators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 244 (1978); Treece, American Law Analogues of
the Author's "Moral Right," 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 487 (1968); Note, supra note 12.
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dally his artistic reputation.1 4 Upon creation of an original concept,
the performer is rightfully entitled to any commercial value gained
from his endeavors.'" The performer thus has several reasons to pre-
vent the unauthorized reproduction of his performance. 6 First, an un-
authorized use deprives him of control over the quality of the
reproduction necessary to ensure an accurate portrayal of his capabili-
ties.17 Second, the use may reduce his power to attract audiences be-
cause the appropriator may compete at a lower cost.' Third, the
performer desires to share in the royalties gained from sales of his per-
formances. 9 Finally, the performer wants control over the use of his
performances, 20 that is, the ability to choose who uses his creative
product.2'
Contract law, although permitting the entertainer to place some limi-
tations upon the use of his work,2 is inadequate as the sole avenue for
protection. The performer can get relief only against those who are
parties to the contract or with whom he is in privity. It provides no
14. A person is entitled to "reap the fruits of his labor." See, e.g., Metropolitan Opera Ass'n
v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 802, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 497 (Sup. Ct. 1950),
aft'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327
Pa. 433, 442, 194 A. 631, 640 (1937). See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
15. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co,, 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977); Groucho
Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., No. 80-2310, slip op. at 5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1981); Estate
of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1360 (D.N.J. 1981).
16. See, eg., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Metropoli-
tan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct.
1950), aft'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
17. See, e.g., Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786,
101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
18. Traicoff, Rights ofthe Ferforming Artist in His Interpretation and Peformance, 11 AIR L.
REv. 225, 241 (1940).
19. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1350 (D.N.J. 1981). See note 16 supra.
See also Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 18 Misc. 2d 626, 188 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Sup. Ct. 1959), rev'd
and remanded, 11 A.D.2d 47, 201 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1960), reversal aff'dper curlam, 10 N.Y.2d 972,
180 N.E.2d 248, 224 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1961).
20. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977).
21. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Waring v.
WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937). See Note, Human Cannonballs
and the First.4mendment: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 30 STAN. L. REV. 1185,
1188-90 (1978).
22. See Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 926 (1956); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786,
101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1950), aft'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951); Liebig, supra note 9, at 42;
Comment, The Twilight Zone: Meanderings in the Area of Pqeformers'Rights, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
819 (1962).
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protection from improper use by the general public.23 Thus, the bur-
den of providing greater protection is left to other substantive-state law
theories.
This Note discusses the unavailability of federal copyright protection
for performances. It then explores the elements of various state actions
through the use of common fact patterns.24 Finally, this Note analyzes
the effectiveness of these state actions in safeguarding performance
rights and proposes a model code that would adequately protect per-
formers' interests.
II. FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
A. Live Peiformance Copyright Protection
Live performances are copyrightable if they come within the subject
matter definition in section 102 of the 1976 Act.25 Copyright protection
attaches only to original works of authorship26 fixed in a tangible
23. Comment, supra note 22, at 819.
24. Because of the difficulty of defining a performance, an examination of four common fact
patterns involving performers is the best method for bringing into sharp focus the inadequacy of
current legal protection for performances. In each scenario the entertainer develops a creative
product that another person uses without the entertainer's authorization. Although the situations
vary slightly, each is illustrative of common problems entertainers face in protecting their per-
formance rights. Each example also presupposes that no express contract exists between the per-
former and the appropriator and that the performances are live and unrecorded.
25. The subject matter provision of the 1976 Act states, in pertinent part:
(a) Copyright protection subsists. . . in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;,
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea ....
17 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. 1111979).
26. The legislative history indicates that
[t]he phrase "original works of authorship," which is purposely left undefined, is in-
tended to incorporate without change the standard of originality established by the
courts under the present copyright statute. This standard does not include requirements
of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the standard
of copyright protection to require them.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976) [hereinafter cited as House REPORT].
Thus, the copyright "originality" concept differs from the "novelty" standard applied in the patent
Washington University Open Scholarship
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form.27 Unrecorded live performances do not satisfy the fixation re-
quirement and are, therefore, not protected under the Act. The
stringent fixation requirement for live performances severely limits the
availability of federal copyright protection for most performers.
There is one situation, however, in which live performances satisfy
the subject matter requirement. If a live performance is simultaneously
recorded and transmitted over the airwaves, federal copyright protec-
tion adheres to the recording.28 The recording satisfies the fixation re-
quirement. The work as fixed in a tangible form is perceivable either
directly or with the aid of a mechanical device.
B. Copyright Preemption Concerns
Resolution of the threshold subject matter inquiry is also necessary
to determine whether state law remedies are preempted.29 Section 301
of the 1976 Act delineates the scope of federal copyright preemption.30
context. See Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 441 F.2d
579 (9th Cir. 1971); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). Any
distinguishable variation, even an unintentional one, supports a copyright if the author indepen-
dently creates the work. Courts will not weigh artistic merit. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho-
graphing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 'ut cf Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 189 F.2d
104, 106 (3d Cir. 1951) ("in order for a map to be copyrightable its preparation must involve a
modicum of creative work"). See also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 10.2.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. III 1979). Fixation in a tangible form is a basic condition of
copyright protection. Thus, copyright protection is given to television and radio programs that are
videotaped or recorded simultaneously with their transmission. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 3,
§ 1.08[C][2]. Improvisations, unrecorded performances, choreographic works, and broadcasts are
not protected. HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 83-86. The protection is given to the tangible
form itself, but not to the underlying performance.
28. The legislative history of the Act states:
The further question to be considered is whether there has been a fixation. If the images
and sounds to be broadcast are first recorded (on a videotape, film, etc.) and then trans-
mitted, the recorded work would be considered a "motion picture" subject to statutory
protection against unauthorized reproduction or retransmission of the broadcast. If the
program content is transmitted live to the public while being recorded at the same time,
the case would be treated the same; the copyright owner would not be forced to rely on
common law rather than statutory rights in proceeding against an infringing user of the
live broadcast.
House REPORT, supra note 26, at 52.
29. "[IThe concept of fixation is important since it not only determines whether the provi-
sions of the statute apply to a work, but it also represents the dividing line between common law
and statutory protection." Id
30. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. III 1979).
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in
works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within
the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss4/8
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Any state law that protects the same subject matter and creates rights
additional or equivalent to the exclusive rights in the Act is circum-
scribed.3' Thus, courts employ a two-tiered preemption analysis.
32
The subject matter prong is determined by reference to Section 102.11
Although section 102 is not an exclusive list of copyright matter, its
flexibility is designed to accommodate technical innovation.34 Follow-
ing a determination that the work is within the subject matter of copy-
right and is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, the courts then
examine whether the rights the performer seeks to vindicate qualify for
copyright protection. As previously indicated, the Act does not cover
before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively
by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any
such work under the common-law or statutes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common-law
or statutes of any State with respect to-
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as speci-
fied by sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible
medium of expression; or
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106.
Id
31. The intention of Section 301, which is the Federal preemption section is to preempt
and abolish any rights under the common law or the statutes of a state that are
equivalent to copyright and that extend to works coming within the scope of the Federal
copyright law.
122 CONG. REc. 31982 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Hutchinson). Accord, HousE REPORT, supra note
26, at 130. See Diamond, Preemption of State Law, 25 COPYRIGHT BULL. 204, 207 (1977).
32. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)-(b) (Supp. III 1979); Mentlik, Federal Preemption in the Field of Intel-
lectual Creations-An End to the Common Law Copyright, 23 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 115,
130 (1977).
33. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
34. Mentlik, supra note 32, at 131-32.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (Supp. III 1979). The equivalent rights analysis applies only to copy-
rightable works. Id § 301(b)(l) (Supp. III 1979); H.R. CON. REP. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5810, 5819 [hereinafter cited as CON-
FERENCE REPORT].
"The preemption of rights under State law is complete with respect to any work coming within
the scope of the bill, even though the scope of exclusive rights given the work under the bill is
narrower than the scope of common law rights in the work might have been." HousE REPORT,
supra note 26, at 131.
The exclusive rights in copyrighted works are enunciated in § 106:
[Tihe owner of copyright.. . has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
Washington University Open Scholarship
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live, unrecorded performances.36 Therefore, the equivalent rights
prong is irrelevant in that context. Both section 301(b)(1) and the Act's
legislative history recognize this exemption from federal preemption.37
State remedies purporting to protect simultaneously recorded and
transmitted performances, however, are preempted if equivalent rights
are provided.38
There is also constitutional support for the proposition that the 1976
Act does not preempt state law protection of live performances. Con-
stitutional limitations prevent Congress from legislating with regard to
works not encompassed within the Copyright Clause.39 The Clause
only protects "writings."40 A live performance is not a "writing" be-
cause it is not fixed in a tangible form.4" Thus, Congress' power to
legislate with regard to these works is limited.42 The express language
of section 301(b)(3)43 of the Act and the accompanying legislative his-
tory recognize this constitutional limitation.'
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work pub-
licly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. III 1979).
36. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
37. [U]nfixed works are not included in the specified "subject matter of copyright."
They are therefore not affected by the preemption of section 301, and would continue to
be subject to protection under state statute or common law until fixed in a tangible form.
[ S]ection 301(b) explicitly preserves common law copyright protection for one
important class of works: works that have not been "fixed in any tangible medium of
expression." Examples would include choreography that has never been filmed or no-
tated, an extemporaneous speech, "original works of authorship" communicated solely
through conversations or live broadcasts, and a dramatic sketch or musical composition
improvised or developed from memory and without being recorded or written down.
HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 131. See note 30 supra for the text of § 301.
38. For a fuller discussion of the controversy surrounding the "equivalent rights" prong, see
HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 131-32; CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 35, at 78; 122 CoNG.
REC. 31982 (1976) (Remarks of Reps. Hutchinson, Sieberling, and Rallsback). See also Fetter,
Copyright Revision and the Preemption of State Misappropriation Law: A Study in Judicial and
Congressional Interaction, 25 COPYRIGHT BULL. 367 (1978).
39. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 1.01[B][1][a].
40. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
41. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 1.01[B][l][a].
42. Id Nimmer comments that "[i]f Congress lacks the power to legislate with respect to
such works, it also lacks the power to preempt such state legislation." Id § 1.01[B][2][a] at 1-22.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979). See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
44. In a general way subsection (b) of section 301 represents the obverse of subsection
(a). It sets out, in broad terms and without necessarily being exhaustive, some of the
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Even prior to the enactment of the 1976 Act the Supreme Court held
that the Copyright Act of 1909 was not exclusive.a5 States could legis-
late with regard to works beyond the scope of the 1909 Act. Early
Supreme Court decisions precluded state unfair competition laws that
protected works omitted from the federal laws and deemed the federal
copyright and patent laws exclusive.46 In 1973, however, the Court in
Goldstein v. California47 concluded that the federal copyright law did
not preempt a California antipiracy statute for tapes and records.
4
Goldstein held that Congress' power under the Copyright Clause was
not exclusive and that states could protect those areas the federal copy-
right act left unattended.49
In 1977 the Court in Zacchini v. Scr#ps-Howard Broadcasting Co. 
50
recognized the existence of concurrent state protection for works not
within the constitutional scope of copyright. Zacchini recognized the
right of a performer to assert a common-law right of publicity to re-
dress an appropriation of his entire performance by the television news
media.5 Although the Court did not discuss the question whether
principal areas of protection that preempting would not prevent the States from protect-
ing. Its purpose is to make clear, consistent with the 1964 Supreme Court decisions in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. Y. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Light-
ing, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, that preemption does not extend to causes of action, or subject
matter outside the scope of the revised Federal copyright statute.
HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 131.
45. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 357 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
46. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 357 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
[W]hen an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid
others to copy that article. To forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy,
found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of
allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the
public domain.
376 U.S. at 237.
47. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
48. Id at 571.
49. [Ihe language of the Constitution neither explicitly precludes the States from grant-
ing copyrights nor grants such authority exclusively to the Federal Government ...
No reason exists why Congress must take affirmative action either to authorize protec-
tion of all categories of writings or to free them from all restraint. We therefore conclude
that, under the Constitution, the states have not relinquished all power to grant to au-
thors "the exclusive Right to their respective Writings."
Id at 560. Accord, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1974). Cf. Mercury
Record Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 163, 218 N.W.2d 705 (1974) (exten-
sion of right to common law as well as state statutory protection).
50. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
51. Id at 577.
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Zacchini could copyright his act, it recognized the ability of a state to
protect live, unrecorded performances. 2  In both Goldstein and
Zacchini, the Court declined to consider the subject matter within the
patent or copyright laws. 3
III. STATE LAW PROTECTION
Entertainers may protect their interests in live, unrecorded perform-
ances under various state laws. The following discussion examines the
elements of four state causes of action upon which performers must
often rely: common-law copyright,54 right of publicity,
55 passing off,5 6
and misappropriation.5 7 The effectiveness of these substantive theories
in protecting performers' interests is illustrated by common fact
patterns.58
A. Common-Law Copyright: The Nightclub Performer
The nightclubpe /onner, after years of struggling, creates a successful act
combining improvisation and impersonation. Another performer sees the
act, notes the tremendous public approval of it, and takes the act as his own
without the creating entertainer's consent. Consequently, the creator loses
much of his audience appeal because of this taking and seeks redress from
the appropriator.
The nightclub performer may use the common-law copyright theory
to recover for the unconsented use of his creation. Because the 1976
Act preempts only common-law copyright for works within the scope
of the Act,59 unfixed creations are not affected.60
Prior to the passage of the 1976 Act a dual system of copyright pro-
tection existed.61 Before publication of a writing an author had a com-
mon-law copyright interest in his work. This common-law copyright
52. Id
53. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (recovery allowed
on misappropriation rather than copyright theory); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973)
(sound recordings not within the subject matter of copyright under 1909 Act).
54. See notes 59-77 infra and accompanying text.
55. See notes 78-122 infra and accompanying text.
56. See notes 123-46 infra and accompanying text.
57. See notes 147-70 infra and accompanying text.
58. Although only one fact pattern will be used to explore each area of state law, these legal
theories are not mutually exclusive and may be combined in any cause of action.
59. See notes 25-27 & 29-38 supra and accompanying text.
60. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
61. 1 M. NIMMmR, supra note 3, § 1.01[A].
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entitled him to relief against any unconsented appropriation of his
work.62 Upon publication, the author either obtained a federal copy-
right63 or permitted dedication of his work into the public domain. The
1976 Act eliminates this dichotomy and protects both published and
unpublished writings. 64 Because a live, unrecorded performance is not
a writing,65 the 1976 Act does not bar state relief for the nightclub per-
former's claim.
Although the performer's claim is theoretically valid, there is insuffi-
cient case law interpreting the post-1976 viability of the cause of action
to define clearly the requisite elements. Regardless of this ambiguity,
the performer must show a property interest in the performance. 6 This
interest is established when the performer develops an original crea-
tion.67 Moreover, although the creation is unfixed, the performer must
express it concretely. 68 This property status enables the performer to
control the use of the performance through contract.6 9 The performer's
interest also prevents unauthorized uses of the performance.7 ° When a
performer engages in a live act in front of a limited audience, an im-
plied contract exists between them. The performer controls the audi-
ence's use of his performance by prohibiting audio and video recording
62. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Classic Film Museum, Inc. v. Warner
Bros., Inc., 453 F. Supp. 852, 854 n.l (D. Me. 1978). See generally Comment, supra note 22, at
820-40; Note, "Copyright" Protection For Uncopyrightables.: The Common-Law Doctrines, 108 U.
PA. L. REV. 699, 702-09 (1960).
63. If an author did not register his copyrightable work then he lost all rights to it. Further-
more, to qualify for federal copyright protection the work had to be original and in a tangible
form. Copyright Act, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp.
III 1979)). See Burke v. NBC, 598 F.2d 688, 691 (1st Cir. 1979).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1978).
Federal copyright protection is therefore given to all works, published or unpublished. To sue
for infringement of the copyright the work must be registered, but the cause of action may arise
while the work is unpublished. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 408-412 (Supp. III 1979).
65. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338, 340 (E.D.N.C. 1939); KGB, Inc. v. Gian-
noulas, 104 Cal. App. 3d 844, 854, 164 Cal. Rptr. 571, 581 (1980); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v.
Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 802, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483,497 (Sup. Ct. 1950), afrd,
279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
67. The performance must only be original; it is not necessary that it be novel or unique.
Comment, supra note 22, at 823-24.
68. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.02.
69. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 299 F.2d 481, 487 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 926 (1956).
70. See Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 799,
101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 495 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951); Waring v.
WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 440, 194 A. 631, 638 (1937).
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devices in the theater. Any unauthorized taking of the creation violates
the performer's property right in his work.7'
The 1976 Act eliminated the need to determine whether a creator
published a writing before granting protection.72 For works that are
not writings in the constitutional sense, however, courts still must deter-
mine the matter of dedication to public use before state law protection
adheres. At least one state has codified the doctrine that protection is
never given to published works.73 In such instances the statute requires
intentional publication.74 Mere performance before an audience is not
always sufficient intention,75 especially in circumstances in which the
creator gains his livelihood by performing.76 Thus, under common-law
copyright the nightclub performer may recover for the unauthorized
appropriation upon showing that the performance is his property and
that he has not intentionally dedicated it to public use. He need not
comply with any formality associated with statutory copyright.77
B. The Right of Publicity: The Marketability of a Reputation
A famous actor develops a public reputation because of his successfulper-
formances. The actor, or his heirs, desires to capitalize on this success. He
finds that his reputation, as expressed in his name, likeness, orpersonality, is
a marketable commodity An advertiser, recognizing the commercial value
of the actor's reputation, uses the actor's name, likeness, or personality to
71. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 1.03[A].
72. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. III 1979).
73. CAL. CIV. CODE § 983(a) (Deering 1971).
74. Burke v. NBC, 598 F.2d 688, 691 (1st Cir. 1979).
75. The United States Supreme Court, in Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 435 (1911), held
that "[a]t common-law, the public performance of [a] play is not an abandonment of it to public
use." See Burke v. NBC, 598 F.2d 688 (1st Cir. 1979) (granting one person's request to use film
for television not publication allowing another company to use film); Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955) (sale of records to public not dedication to
the public); King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (speech before crowd
not publication); Lennon v. Pulsebeat News, Inc., [1964] 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)
(public interviews not publication or abandonment of ownership); CBS v. Documentaries Unlim-
ited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (rendering of performance before
microphone not an abandonment of ownership or dedication to the public).
76. [I]t would be absurd to consider performance publication with regard to the per-
former while at the same time recognizing in him a property right in his performance.
This would mean that the very act essential to creation would at the same time operate to
destroy the right. It would follow that the performer retains his property right in the live
ephemeral performance.
Comment, supra note 22, at 826.
77. 1 M. NimmER, supra note 3, § 2.02.
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sell aproduct. The actorfinding that this irreparably damages the marketa-
bility of his reputation, desires compensation/or this unauthorized use of his
name, likeness, or personality.
The actor may use the evolving right of publicity to recover for the
unauthorized use of his name, likeness, personality, or performance.
The right of publicity is an independent tort doctrine protecting an in-
dividual's pecuniary interest in these characteristics.78 The doctrine
recognizes that persons should profit from publicity values they create
or acquire.79 The right of publicity promotes the state's interest in en-
couraging creativity in the entertainment field.80
The right of publicity developed because the right of privacy inade-
quately protects a person's commercial interests in his name, likeness,
and personality.8' The right of privacy is a negative right.8 2 It com-
78. See, e.g., Zacehini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Cepeda v.
Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day &
Night Co., No. 80-2310 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1981); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339
(D.NJ. 1981); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Worldvi-
sion Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979); All v.
Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F.
Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), af'd, 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979);
Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), rev'd on
other groundr, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970); Sharman v. C.
Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96
NJ. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967); Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 10 N.Y.2d 972, 180 N.E.2d
298, 224 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1961); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396
N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977); Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., [1957] 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314 (Pa. C.P.). But
see Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352
(1979); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979). See
generally Fletcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88
YALE .J. 1577 (1979); Nimmer, The Right oPublicty, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203 (1954);
Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses and Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV.
637 (1973); Note, T"he Right of/Publicity--Protection/or Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 527 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Right ofPublici]; Note, Peformer's Right of Public-
ity" A Limitation on News Privilege, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 587 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Performer's Right ofPubliciy].
The pecuniary value of the entertainer's name, likeness, personality, and performance is ac-
quired through the investment of time, effort, and money.
79. One commentator defines it as "the right of each person to control and profit from the
publicity values which he has created or purchased." Nimmer, supra note 78, at 216.
80. The right of publicity promotes "the creation of entertainment, much as the copyright
and patent laws encourage other types of creativity." Note, Performer's Right ofPublicity, supra
note 78, at 598.
81. The right of privacy is the right of an individual "to be let alone"--free from unwar-
ranted intrusions into his private life. See E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
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pensates for injury to feelings or emotional distress8 3 resulting from
"commercial appropriation of elements of personality." 4 The right of
privacy is a personal right that is neither assignable nor descendible.8 5
Damages are awarded only for a highly offensive intrusion into a per-
son's life. 6 Moreover, the right of privacy contains a waiver doctrine
LAW PRIMER 447 (1975); Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55
Nw. U.L. REv. 553, 554 (1960); Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890); Note, Right of Publicity, supra note 78, at 528; Note, Performer's Right of Publicity,
supra note 78, at 595; Note, supra note 7, at 588. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 122
Ga. 190, 52 S.E. 68 (1905). See generally Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960);
Yankowich, The Right of Privacy, 27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 499 (1952).
Dean Prosser divided the right of privacy into four separate causes of action: (1) unreasonable
invasion of another's seclusion; (2) unreasonable publicity given to the private life of another,
(3) publicity that would unreasonably place another in a false light to the public; and (4) appro-
priation of another's name or likeness. Prosser, supra, at 389. Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652A (1977). The fourth cause of action has developed into the right of publicity.
See E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra, at 453-55; Gordon, supra, at 570; Treece, supra note 78, at 637;
Note, Right of Publicity, supra note 78, at 532; Note, supra note 62, at 718. See generally Com-
ment, supra note 22. Compare Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323 (1979) with Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d
661 (1977).
82. Pilpel, The Right of Publicity-The Tenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 27 Copy-
RIGHT BULL. 249, 252 (1980).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H (1977):
One who has established a cause of action for invasion of his privacy is entitled to re-
cover damages for
(a) the harm to his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion;
(b) his mental distress proved to have been suffered if it is of a kind that normally
results from such an invasion; and
(c) special damage of which the invasion is a legal cause.
See, e.g., Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Tulles, 219 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1955); McCreery v. Miller's
Grocerteria, 99 Colo. 499, 64 P.2d 803 (1936).
84. Chaplin v. NBC, 15 F.R.D. 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
85. Only the person whose privacy is invaded may assert the right of privacy. James v.
Screen Gems, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 2d 650, 653, 344 P.2d 799, 801 (1959); E. KINTNER & J. LAHR,
supra note 81, at 452; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652, Comment a (1977); Note, Per-
former'sRight of Publicity, supra note 78, at 598. See also Maritote v. Desilu Prods., 345 F.2d 418
(9th Cir. 1965); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1979).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 652B, D & E (1977); Prosser, supra note 81, at
391.
The reasonableness of the intrusion upon privacy is a consideration in determining whether a
tort has occurred. Courts have awarded damages under all four of the actions articulated by
Prosser. See note 81 supra. See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821
(9th Cir. 1974); Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Miller v. NBC, 157 F.
Supp. 240 (D. Del. 1957); Bernstein v. NBC, 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 369
(D.C. Cir.), ceri. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956); Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50
S.E. 68 (1905); Walker v. Whittle, 83 Ga. App. 445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951); Young v. Western & Atd.
R.R., 39 Ga. App. 761, 148 S.E. 345 (1929); Welsh v. Roehm, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952);
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that bars public figures from recovering for unconsented appropriations
of name, likeness, or personality. 7
The right of publicity, however, encourages the promotional use of
the personality. 8 Performers intentionally publicize their activities and
creations to promote the exploitation of the advertising values in their
names, likenesses, and personalities. The right of publicity protects the
performer's ability to decide how these publicity characteristics will be
used. A performer may recover for any unauthorized use of the values,
subject only to a limited number of restrictions.8 9
The actor may recover for an advertiser's unauthorized use of his
name, likeness, personality, or performance because he has a controll-
able property interest in these characteristics. 90 The actor creates this
Edison v. Edison-Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (Ch. 1907); Rosemont Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct.), affdasmodpfed, 42
A.D.2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973); Meyers v. U.S. Camera Pub. Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 765, 167
N.Y.S.2d 771 (Civ. Ct. 1957); Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., [1957] 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314 (Pa.
C.P.).
Courts, however, have limited remedies for the fourth category to nominal damages. See, e.g.,
Chaplin v. NBC, 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 291 F. Supp. 242 (E.D.
Mo. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Sharman v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 216 F. Supp.
401 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458
(1967); Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
87. Under the right of privacy an individual, such as a performer, waives his privacy right
when he places himself in the public light. E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note 81, at 453; Prosser,
supra note 81, at 410-14. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942); Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 1004
(W.D. Okla. 1938), rev'don other grounds, 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939); Metter v. Los Angeles
Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939); Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354,
107 N.E.2d 485 (1952); Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338 (C.P. 1938).
Waiver may be limited, however, to public activity so that the more intimate details of a per-
former's life retain privacy protection. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977); Pros-
ser, supra note 81, at 415-19.
88. E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note 81, at 459; Nimmersupra note 78, at 204; Pipel,supra
note 82, at 252.
89. See notes 106-15 infra and accompanying text.
90. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Memphis Dev. Foun-
dation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205
(8th Cir. 1969); Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert de-
nied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866
(2d Cir.), ceri. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aI'd, 603 F.2d 214
(2d Cir. 1979); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative
Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 441
F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), rey'don other grounds, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980); Price v. Hal
Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277
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property interest through successful performances. As a result of this
property status, contract law performs an important role in protecting
the performer's interests. The right of publicity is assignable and may
be made the subject of an exclusive license.9 This aspect of the right
enhances the actor's advertising value while decreasing the possibility
of another's unauthorized, uncompensated appropriation of the actor's
personality or performance.92
Case law supports the actor's claim. In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. , the first case to embrace the theory of the
right of publicity, the Second Circuit held that a baseball player's ex-
clusive contract with one chewing gum manufacturer for the use of his
photograph precluded another chewing gum manufacturer from enter-
ing into a similar contract with the ballplayer. 94 The court distin-
guished the right of privacy from the right of publicity and noted that
the publicity right is independent and is capable of assignment.9" The
court also recognized that the inability to make an exclusive grant of
the right would render its monetary value worthless.
Another court, extending this holding, included within the theory's
(D. Minn. 1970); Sharman v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Uproar
Co. v. NBC, 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934), modpfied, 81 F.2d 373 (Ist Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 670 (1936); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal Rptr. 323
(1979); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977);
Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., [1957] 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314 (Pa. C.P.).
91. Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 957-58 (6th Cir. 1980);
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 816 (1953); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1093 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426,429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative
Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp.
836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970); E.
KiNTNER & J. LAHR, supra note 81, at 459; Nimmer, supra note 78, at 216.
92. Thus, if someone impermissibly appropriates a name, likeness, or personality that is the
subject of an exclusive license, the appropriator is liable to the licensee for inducing a breach of
contract. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y 1977);
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Memphis Dev. Founda-
tion v. Factors Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 616 F.2d
956 (6th Cir. 1980). See notes 99-105 infra and accompanying text.
93. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
94. Id. at 869.
95. [I]n addition to and independent of that right of privacy .. a man has a right in
the publicity value of his photograph, Le, the right to grant the exclusive privilege of
publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be made "in gross," i.e., without
an accompanying transfer of a business or of anything else.
Id. at 868.
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protection a performer's proprietary interest in his reputation.96 The
reputation in this context is adjunct to the property interest in the like-
ness because it is actually responsible for the marketable publicity
value of the name, likeness, or personality. Under this theory, courts
also grant relief for inducing the breach of an exclusive contract with a
well-known personality or appropriating the name, likeness, photo-
graph, or performance of a personality without permission.97
The major importance of the actor's ability to assign his right of pub-
licity lies in his capability to prevent an advertiser from using the ac-
tor's publicity characteristics to imply endorsement of the advertiser's
product.98 Audience appeal is created through the performances that
make the celebrity famous,99 but only at the expense of the privacy
surrendered in becoming a public personality."°° The performer's in-
jury in advertising cases is, therefore, more than his present loss of
compensation. Rather, the use injures his public reputation and "di-
minishes the future value of his endorsement."' 101 Moreover, this unau-
thorized use unjustly enriches the advertiser at the performer's
expense. 102
96. All v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
97. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); O'Brien v. Pabst Sales
Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942); Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v.
Day & Night Co., No. 80-2310 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1981); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp.
1339 (D.NJ. 1981); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970); Sharman v. C.
Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Uproar Co. v. NBC, 8 F. Supp. 358 (D.
Mass. 1934). But see Republic Pictures Corp. v. Rogers, 213 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1954); Autry v.
Republic Prods., 104 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
98. "Financial success in the exploitation of a celebrity's name or portrait is attained only
when the corporation or advertising agency possesses a right to the use of that name or portrait."
E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note 81, at 452-53.
99. As one commentator suggests, "[a]udience appeal is a principal stock-in-trade of a celeb-
rity." Treece, supra note 78, at 64.
100. Id. The surrender of the privacy right entitles the entertainer to whatever financial bene-
fits are gained from his performances.
101. Id.
In three kinds of cases the advertisement may... injure the future earning capactiy
of the celebrity: (1) when the advertised product or service is shoddy; (2) when the per-
son pictured or named in the advertisement has already endorsed a like product; and
(3) when a significant segment of the public knows that the person neither uses nor rec-
ommends the product. In each case, the advertising use of the name or picture suggests
that the individual is irresponsible and willing to deceive the consuming public--sugges-
tions that probably would diminish the future value of the celebrity's endorsement.
Id. at 642-45. See, ag., Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Say., 501 F.2d 1082 (8th
Cir. 1974); Lahr v. Addll Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
102. Treece, supra note 78, at 646.
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Unauthorized use of publicity characteristics constitutes an interfer-
ence with future contracts. An advertiser appropriating an actor's per-
sonality characteristics without his consent may be liable to the actor
for the commercial advertising value of the name, likeness, or personal-
ity.- 0 3 To recover, the actor need only show an unconsented use. It is
not necessary that the advertiser use the charactertistics for "advertising
purposes" or for "purposes of trade."" The difficulty of proving dam-
ages in nonadvertising cases, however, may operate either to limit re-
covery to actual loss suffered or force the actor to seek equitable relief.
During his lifetime, the actor will generally succeed in actions
against the advertiser for unauthorized uses of his publicity characteris-
tics.10 Following his death, however, his heirs may find their efforts to
recover thwarted. The descendibility of the right of publicity is not
uniformly recognized. 106 District courts in the Second Circuit, inter-
preting New York law, hold that the right of publicity is descendible to
the performer's heirs following the performer's lifetime exploitation.10 7
103. Nimmer, supra note 78, at 216; Note, Right of Pubicity, supra note 78, at 533; Note,
Performer's Right ofPublicity, supra note 78, at 601. See Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp.
836, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
104. E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note 81, at 449. A number of states have codified the right
of privacy. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering 1972); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214,
§ 3A (West Supp. 1976); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 839.1-3 (West Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 18.2-216.1 (Supp. 1980).
New York was the first state to codify the right of privacy, and its provision exemplifies such
laws:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of
trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained the
written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of
a misdemeanor.
N.Y. Cwv. RIaHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976). Courts strictly construe this statute: "[i1t is clear
that the Civil Rights Law is to be strictly construed and is not to be applied so as to prohibit the
portrayal of an individual's personality or style of performance." Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane &
Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (1977). Accord, Namath v. Sports
Illustrated, 80 Misc. 2d 531, 363 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1975), a f'd, 39 N.Y.2d 897, 352 N.E.2d
584, 386 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1976).
105. See, ag., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Ali v.
Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D.
Minn. 1970); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979).
106. See notes 107-15 infra and accompanying text. See generally Fletcher & Rubin, supra
note 78, at 1593-94; Note, Right of Publicity, supra note 78, at 541-49.
107. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Worldvision
Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F.
Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 282
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But V.c
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The lifetime exploitation requirement is a recent development.108  In
earlier decisions, this requirement is absent. 09 Second Circuit district
courts have also granted heirs actual damages for unauthorized appro-
priations of deceased performer's characterizations. 01
California courts, by contrast, deny relief to a celebrity's heirs for
infringement of the right of publicity, regardless of the celebrity's life-
time exploitation of the right."I  In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,12 the
heirs of Bela Lugosi sought to recover the profits a motion picture com-
pany made through an allegedly unauthorized licensing of the charac-
ter of Count Dracula. The California Supreme Court upheld a lower
court ruling that denied the heirs' claim, reasoning that the ability to
exploit one's name, likeness, or personality for commercial use is en-
compassed under the right of privacy, is personal to the artist, and is
not descendible. 13 Lugosi, therefore, could have exploited the right
during his lifetime, but the right died with him." 4 Thus, an actor's
heirs will not recover in California because the right of publicity as an
Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 10 N.Y.2d 972, 180 N.E.2d 298, 224 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1961) (no
property right in bandleader's style or "sound," and therefore none could pass to his widow).
Although New York courts have not explicitly recognized the common law right of publicity,
there has been no denial that such a right exists. See Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night
Co., No. 80-2310 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1981); Wojtowicz v. Delacorte Press, 43 N.Y.2d 858, 374
N.E.2d 129, 403 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1978); Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768, 427
N.Y.S.2d 828 (1980).
108. See generally Fletcher & Rubin, supra note 78; Comment, The Descendibility of the Right
of Publiaty: Is There Commercial Lfe After Death, 89 YALE L.J. 1125 (1980). See also note 109
infra.
The exploitation requirement demands only an overt recognition of the extrinsic commercial
value of the name, likeness, personality, or performance. Association of the characteristics with
an advertising product is unnecessary. See Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., Inc.,
No. 80-2310, slip op. at 12-17 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1981); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp.
426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
109. See Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
110. Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v.
Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
11 . See, e.g., Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 869, 603 P.2d 454, 460,
160 CaL Rptr. 352, 358 (1979); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 818, 603 P.2d 425, 428,
160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 326 (1979); James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 2d 650, 653, 344 P.2d
799, 801 (1959).
112. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
113. Id. at 822, 603 P.2d at 430, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
114. Id. 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329. The California Supreme Court reached a
similar result in a Lugoxi companion case. See Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d
860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
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independent tort doctrine is not recognized. California relies upon the
right of privacy to provide the desired protection.
Although the actor desires recovery from an advertiser, in some cases
he may also wish to recover for a nonadvertising use. In these situa-
tions first amendment limitations may impede recovery. The right of
publicity does not extend to the use of names or likenesses in connec-
tion with fictionalized books or movies." 5 The first amendment de-
fense of newsworthiness may limit recovery for infringement of the
right of publicity.16 Other first amendment rights also circumscribe
the operation of the right of publicity.' 1
7
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. 118 the United States
Supreme Court balanced these interests and held that a television sta-
tion's appropriation of a performer's entire act for its news program
was not within the scope of the first amendment privilege of freedom of
press. 19 The performer, a human cannonball, obtained relief for the
appropriation based on his right to the publicity value of his
performance. 120
115. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y 1978); Guglielmi v. Spell-
ing-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 867, 603 P.2d 454, 459, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 357 (1979) (Bird,
C.J., concurring).
116. Because the right of publicity applies only to the use of a name, likeness, or personality
for commercial or advertising purposes it cannot prevent the dissemination of news. The defense
of newsworthiness is, however, subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967); Spalm v. Julian
Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.S.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1968).
117. See, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Irving, 49 A.D.2d 445, 375 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1975);
Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Rosemont
Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1968), a'd, 32
A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969).
The defense of fair use may be claimed if the characteristics are used for purposes of parody,
satire, or literary commentary because of the contributions these works make to the arts field.
Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., No. 80-2310, slip op. at 19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5,
1981); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1356-61 (D.N.J. 1981). See note I Isupra.
In any case, the court must balance the first amendment claims against the appropriated public-
ity rights. The balancing test involves a determination of whether the use of the work is designed
primarily to disseminate thoughts, ideas, or information or for commercial purposes. See
Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., No. 80-2310, slip op. at 18 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5,
1981); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1356 (D.N.J. 1981).
118. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
119. "The Constitution no more prevents a State from requiring respondent to compensate
petitioner for broadcasting his act on television than it would privilege respondent to film and
broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the copyright owner ..... Id. at 575.
120. Id. at 576.
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The successful actor will also find that the right of publicity protects
his underlying performance as well as personality characteristics.'
2 1
The actor's success in attracting audiences to his performances reflects
the publicity value attached to his name, likeness, and personality. In
Zacchini, the Court stated that "the appropriation of the very activity
by which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first place" is
the strongest case for the right of publicity. 122 Consequently, the actor
who has had his name, likeness, personality, or performance appropri-
ated will recover, in most instances, for violation of the right of
publicity.
C. Passing Off: Stealing a Character
Aspart of his act, a performer creates a distinctive character. Thepublic
associates the character with the actor. An advertiser, desiring to beneft
from thepeformer's success without compensating him, imitates the charac-
ter in its commercials. As a result of the unauthorized and uncompensated
imitation, the performer's reputation and income are diminished He desires
to halt the unauthorized use and recover the advertiser's iilgotten gains.
The performer, to protect his actual performance, may use the unfair
competition theory of "passing off." The essence of this tort is the in-
tentional sale of the goods of one individual as those of another. 2 3 Al-
though "passing off" originated in trademark infringement claims,
courts have extended it by analogy to other areas of intellectual prop-
erty.124 The only drawback to the use of "passing off" in performance
cases is the difficulty the performer may have in satisfying the requisite
elements. 125
121. Id. See also Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co., No. 80-2310
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1981); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
122. 433 U.S. at 576.
123. Win. A. Roger, Ltd. v. Majestic Prods. Corp., 23 F.2d 219, 220 (D. Del. 1927); W. PRos-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 130, at 957 (4th ed. 1971).
124. Federal trademark infringement claims are encompassed under the Lanham Act §§ 29-
45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1111-1127 (Supp. IV 1980). Courts have extended the principles established,
however, to areas of commercial relationships in which the goods of one party are sold to the
public as those of another. See, e.g., Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962); Lone
Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942); Supreme Records, Inc. v. Decca Records, Inc.,
90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (1928). See
generally R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES (3d ed. 1969);
Leach & Feldman, The Relationshp Between Copyright and Unfair Competition Princ7i1es, 10 AS-
CAP CopYiuOrT L. SYmP. 266 (1959).
125. The performer creating the character may recover for the unauthorized use under "pass-
ing ofr' upon a showing that his character acquired a secondary meaning, the advertiser's imita-
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The performer's success in recovering for an unauthorized use of his
distinctive character will largely depend upon the degree of connection
in the public mind between the performer and the actual perform-
ance. 126 This public connection creates the performer's protectible in-
terest in the character. The protectible interest is the good will or
secondary meaning that inures to the character as a result of the per-
former's investment of time, energy, and money in developing a market
for his product.'27
Once a protectible interest is recognized, courts grant relief only
upon a showing of an advertiser's deception as to the source of the
product or performance. 2 ' Actual deception is not a strict require-
ment. The mere likelihood of confusion is sufficient for a violation. 129
Imitation of a product without more, however, is insufficient proof of
the confusion necessary to support an action for "passing off."' 3 Thus,
the actor must show that the advertiser tried to deceive the public into
believing the actor appeared in the commercial.
Performers' attempts to prevent others from uncompensated uses of
imitations of their voices or characterizations for commercial purposes
often fail. 3 ' The entertainers argue that the roles they create acquire
tion deceived the public, and this imitation subsequently injured the performer's goodwill or
reputation. See generally notes 126-38 infra and accompanying text.
126. Compare Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971), and Davis v. TWA, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969), with Lahr v.
Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (lst Cir. 1962), and Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P.
544 (1928).
127. Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane &
Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663-64 (1977).
128. Note, supra note 62 at 710. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711,
715 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650, 654
(4th Cir. 1942); Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., Inc., 89 F.2d 891, 894 (2d Cir. 1937); Sweet
Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, Inc., 15 F.2d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 1926); Davis v. TWA, 297 F. Supp.
1145, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 360, 269 P. 544, 546 (1928).
129. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 760 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1132 (1979); Pennsylvania Dutch Co. v. Pennsylvania Amish Co., [1974] 184 U.S.P.Q. 41, 45 (Pa.
C.P.); Prosser, supra note 123, § 130, at 958.
130. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 906 (1971); Davis v. TWA, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
When there is only imitation, there is normally no deception of the public because of the aware-
ness that the performance is a duplication. Thus, parody and mimicry are protected under the
privilege of fair use. See note 11 supra.
131. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937); Davis
v. TWA, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969). But see Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (Ist
Cir. 1962); Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (1928).
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secondary meanings and thus the public connects the role with that
individual."a2 Courts, however, require a strong showing of intentional
use of the role or style to confuse the public.'33 Mere imitation of the
performance does not establish the requisite intent. 34 Most cases in-
volve attempts to protect individual renditions of songs or characters
rather than pervasive characters or styles that the public identifies with
a single performer.135
The performer's ability to protect his performance is greater when he
develops a unique character or style that pervades all of his perform-
ances. Courts grant relief under "passing off" for fraudulent and de-
ceptive uses of entertainers' characterizations. 36  In Chaplin v.
Amador, 37 another actor billed his movie as containing Charles Aplin.
The court found in favor of Chaplin based on Amador's intentional
"passing off" of his character as that of Chaplin. 138 The court in for-
mulating the right of action focused on Aplin's fraudulent purpose,
Chaplin's injury, and public deception. 139 The court granted relief in
Chaplin mainly because Chaplin developed the appropriated character
so well. Performances linked the character to the famous actor so effec-
tively in the public mind that the use of it harmed the performer in his
professional relationships. " In a related action, damages were recov-
132. Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891, 894 (2d Cir. 1937); Booth v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
133. Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891, 897 (2d Cir. 1937); Davis v. TWA, 297 F.
Supp. 1145, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 1969). Cf. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 716
(9th Cir. 1970) (relief denied because no claim of unique sound presented and because conflict
existed with song owner's copyright privileges), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
134. Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891, 896-97 (2d Cir. 1937); Booth v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 345-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Davis v. TWA, 297 F. Supp. 1145, 1147
(C.D. Cal. 1969).
135. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970) (singer at-
tempted to protect rendition of copyrighted song), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Gardella v.
Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937) (actress attempted to protect name "Aunt Je-
mima" from use by pancake manufacturer); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (actress who used name and likeness of copyrighted cartoon character, pursuant
to license, attempted to prevent company from using similar character in commercials); Davis v.
TWA, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (singing group attempted to protect particular vocal
sounds from use by company in song similar to one they had recorded).
136. See notes 137-41 infra and accompanying text.
137. 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (1928).
138. Id. at 364, 269 P. at 546.
139. The court stated that "[tlhe right of action in such a case arises from the fraudulent pur-
pose and conduct of appellant and the inwury caused to the plaintiff thereby, and the deception to the
public. Id.
140. Id. at 360, 269 P. at 545.
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ered for an unconsented use of an imitation of a performer's unique
voice."'
Prior to recovery the character performer must also prove actual
competition between his performance and that of the appropriator.
142
Clearly, the performer is not competing with the advertiser for the
same audience. When advertisers use imitations of performers' voices,
no competition exists between the product the performer creates-the
performance-and the product using the imitation--the commercial
advertisement. 43 Nevertheless, the performer suffers a competitive in-
jury because the imitation's use decreases the commercial value of the
performer's endorsement. 44 The decisions are unclear, however, with
regard to the actual importance placed upon the competition ele-
ment.14 5 In fact, once there is a clear showing of public deception and
injury to the performer's good will or reputation the courts may
broadly interpret the competition element.
46
D. Misappropriation: Whose Joke Is It?
A comedian improvises a new routine. As he is performing it live, one
member of the audience videotapes the act without the comedian's consent.
The appropriator then makes copies of the videotape and offers them for sale
to the generalpublic. As a result, the comedian loses control over the use of
his performance and the profits gainedfrom such use. The comedian desires
141. See Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 257 (1st Cir. 1962).
142. See note 128 supra.
143. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 906 (1971); Gardelia v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937); Davis v. TWA,
297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
The competition is not even for the same audience. The commercial advertiser appeals to the
television public while the performer attracts those persons interested in viewing his live
performance.
144. See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
The commercial value is developed through the entertainer's success in attracting audiences to
his performances.
145. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970) (no direct
mention of importance of competition element), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Lone Ranger v.
Cox, 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942) (court mentioned that both involved in same field, entertain-
ment); Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937) (court only stated that ade-
quate proof of confusion is necessary); Davis v. TWA, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (no
mention of competition element).
146. Accord, Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786,
101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aft'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951); Waring v. WDAS
Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).
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to halt the sale of the unauthorized recording and to recover the appropria-
tor's profits.
The comedian may use the unfair competition theory of misappro-
priation to recover for the unconsented appropriation of his routine.
Under misappropriation one may not take the property right of another
for commercial benefit without due credit to the creator, even in the
absence of any fraud or deception. 147 In other words, an appropriator
"may not reap where he has not sown." 148 Because of the elimination
of the deception or likelihood of confusion requirement, an action for
misappropriation may lie in the absence of "passing off.'1 49 This the-
ory's only restriction is that some states do not recognize misappropria-
tion as a legitimate unfair competition cause of action and require
satisfaction of the elements of "passing off."' 150 As in other state actions
previously discussed, the Copyright Act of 1976 does not preempt a
147. The United States Supreme Court first recognized misappropriation in International
News Service (INS) v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). In INS the Court held that it was an
act of unfair competition for a rival news service to take plaintiffnews organization's posted mate-
rial and use it to gain a competitive advantage over plaintiff. Id. at 236. The Court decided the
INS case prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and thus it does not constitute
binding precedent on the issue of misappropriation. State courts, however, have adopted the rea-
soning of the INS Court and have extended the misappropriation doctrine beyond the facts of
INS. See, eg., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948); Veatch v.
Wagner, 116 F. Supp. 904 (D. Alaska 1953); Uproar Co. v. NBC, 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934),
cert. denied, 278 U.S. 670 (1936); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 798 (1969); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 II. App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d 874 (1970);
Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483
(Sup. Ct. 1950), aft'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951); Mutual Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting
Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937); Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consul-
tants, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 163, 218 N.W.2d 705 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 914 (1975).
148. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918).
149. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101
N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aft'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951). See Note, Perforiner's
Right qfPublicity, supra note 78, at 602. See also Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d
1034, 155 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. CL 1956); cases cited at note 147 supra.
150. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 906 (1971); Davis v. TWA, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969). See notes 123-45 supra
and accompanying text.
Courts are in conflict over the applicability of theory to appropriations of performances. Com-
pare Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.C. 1939); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad-
casting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938); and Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols
Recorder Corp,, 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), a 'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951), with Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Pa. 1979), and Booth v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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cause of action for misappropriation in this context.'15
The comedian may recover under misappropriation after establish-
ing a property interest in his act. Courts often characterize this prop-
erty interest as quasi-property, for it derives from the ability to exclude
others from using a creation or idea developed through the investment
of time, effort, and money." 2 Under this theory, the comedian is pro-
tected against another's intentional appropriation of his work
product. 1
53
Because misappropriation is a competitive tort, the comedian must
further prove the existence of some competition'54 with the appropriat-
ing audience member. The competition requirement is loosely inter-
151. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
Moreover, there is much disagreement over whether misappropriation provides equivalent
rights to copyright. See note 35 supra. The rationale behind the misappropriation remedy is not
to grant a monopoly to the creator for his work product, but rather to permit him to benefit from
his investment. See Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 163,
175, 218 N.W.2d 705, 710 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 914 (1975); Note, The "Copying-Misappro-
priation" Distinction .4 False Step in the Development f the Sears-Compco Preemption Doctrine,
71 COLUM. L. REV. 1444 (1971).
In CBS v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967), the court dis-
cussed the application of misappropriation to an entertainer's claim. In DeCosta, decided prior to
the Copyright Act of 1976, the court denied the performer recovery against a television network
that misappropriated the performer's character. The performer claimed that by creating the char-
acter role of Paladin, traveling through the country as this character, and passing out cards stating
"Have Gun Will Travel" he had developed a protectible property interest that CBS had misap-
propriated in its television series "Have Gun Will Travel." Id. at 316. The court held, however,
that the printing of the cards was a publication for purposes of copyright and thus plaintiff waived
any rights in the character. Id. at 321.
If a court decided DeCosta today the result might be different, although the action would be
copyright infringement and not misappropriation. For later developments in this case, see De-
Costa v. CBS, 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
152. "Quasi-property is a fiction utilized to protect the plaintiff against unfair competitive
practices of the defendant. . . . 'Quasi-Property' differs from traditional concepts of property in
that it will be employed only to protect the plaintiff against a competitor rather than the public at
large." Comment, supra note 22, at 843. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215, 236 (1918); Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338, 340 (E.D.N.C. 1939); Pittsburgh Athletic
Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490,492 (W.D. Pa. 1938); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v.
Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786,797, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 493 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aI'd,
279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433,
437, 194 A. 631, 634 (1937).
153. See note 152 supra.
154. The creator of the work product may find that the demand for his product has declined as
a result of the misappropriation. Thus, the creator actually finds himself competing with his own
work product.
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preted.155  It permits recovery for either direct 156  or indirect 157
competition. Consequently, under misappropriation a creator may re-
cover against someone who uses the creator's work product in a differ-
ent manner or to a different extent than the creator.
158
In the entertainment field, courts enjoin unauthorized uses of record-
ings of live performances.159 In situations involving direct competition,
the appropriators and the performers use the same medium to dissemi-
nate the performances. 60 In an indirect competition case the perform-
ers recovered when a recording company taped their live radio
performances and sold them to the public. 16 1 In this case, however, the
performers had already granted another company the exclusive right to
record and sell the performances.162 The court granted the performers
a preliminary injunction although the actual competition existed be-
tween the performers' assignee and the other recording company. 63
155. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 796, 101
N.Y.S.2d 483, 492 (Sup. Ct. 1950), af'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
156. Direct competition "exists where the defendant is exploiting the performer's work com-
mercially in the same medium and in the same manner as the performer." Comment, supra note 22,
at 845. See, e.g., Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (1928).
157. Indirect competition exists when the "injury results from defendant's conduct in commer-
cially exploiting the performance in a dfferent manner than that presently employed by the per-
former." Comment, supra note 22, at 845. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D.
Pa. 1938); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101
N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aj'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
158. See notes 156-57 supra. There is no protection afforded against the general public. The
Supreme Court recognized this in International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215
(1918):
The question here is not so much the rights of which party as against the public, but their
rights as between themselves .... fAllthough we may and do assume that neither party
has any remaining property interest as against the public.. . it by no means follows that
there is no remaining property interest in it as between themselves.
Id. at 236.
159. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 805, 101
N.Y.S.2d 483, 500 (Sup. CL 1950), a4 'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951); Waring v. WDAS
Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 455, 194 A. 631, 641-42 (1937).
160. Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338, 339 (E.D.N.C. 1939); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting
Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 440, 194 A. 631, 640 (1937).
161. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 790, 101
N.Y.S.2d 483, 487 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aft'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
Under the 1976 Act, these performances are protectible under federal copyright if simultane-
ously recorded when transmitted. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
162. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 789-90, 101
N.Y.S.2d 483, 486-87 (Sup. CL 1950), aft'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
163. Id. at 805, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
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Thus, the lack of direct competition between performers and the misap-
propriator did not affect the ability to recover. Courts also grant relief
under misappropriation for tape piracy when there is direct competi-
tion between the creator and the appropriator.164
Additionally, the misappropriation theory requires the comedian to
establish injury as a result of the appropriation.'65 The unauthorized,
uncompensated use must commercially benefit the appropriator. The
appropriator is unjustly enriched because he has not invested his own
money in the development of the creation and has not compensated the
creator for its use. Courts liberally interpret the injury requirement.
Relief under misappropriation is predicated on the creator's commer-
cial loss or damaged reputation 66 and not on deception or likelihood
of public confusion. 6 7 Performers can recover for injury to profes-
sional reputation because of the effect on future commercial success.' 68
Performers can also recover for unauthorized uses of recordings' 69 as
well as takings of unique vocal styles for a commercial
advertisement. 170
The comedian's recovery is easiest under misappropriation. To re-
164. See note 11 supra.
165. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 804, 101
N.Y.S.2d 483, 499 (Sup. Ct. 1950), af'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
There is no unfairness in an appropriation unless the owner of the property suffers some loss as
a result of the appropriation, normally in the form of lost profits. See Ahrens, The Misappropria-
tion Doctrine After Sears-Compco, 2 U.S.F.L. REv. 292 (1968); Comment, supra note 22, at 848.
166. "The modem view as to the law of unfair competition does not rest solely on the ground
of direct competitive injury, but on the broader principle that property rights of commercial value
are to be and will be protected from any form of... commercial immorality." Metropolitan
Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 796, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 492 (Sup.
Ct. 1950), aft'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
167. The uncompensated use injures the creator, not the general public. "Generally the public
interest is important only negatively. To justify any regulation of competition, it need not be
shown that it is positively advantageous to the public, but only that the public is not harmed
thereby." Calman, He 1ho Reaps Were He Has Not Sown Unjust Enrichment in the Law of
Unfair Competition, 55 HARV. L. REv. 595, 599 (1942). See also Comment, supra note 22, at 841-
42.
168. Comment, supra note 22, at 848. See, e.g., Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.C.
1939); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938); Metro-
politan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup.
CL 1950), aj'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
169. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 805, 101
N.Y.S.2d 483, 500 (Sup. Ct. 1950), a f'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951); Waring v. WDAS
Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 443, 194 A. 631, 640-41 (1937).
170. Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 258 (Ist Cir. 1962). But see Gee v. CBS, 471 F.
Supp. 600, 659 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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cover for the unauthorized videotaping of his act, the comedian must
show that the appropriator took his property without consent. that this
taking injured him, and that indirect competition for the same audience
existed at the time.
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF RELIEF FOR APPROPRIATIONS
OF PERFORMANCES
There is no unified law for the right of performance. Piecemeal state
law protection of performance interests inadequately compensates en-
tertainers for their contributions and discourages further development
of the creative arts. Protection for performers' intangible interests 7 ' is
unrealistic because, absent any commercial loss, concrete injury is diffi-
cult to prove. The inability of state law effectively to protect perform-
ers' commercial interests, therefore, demonstrates the need for
reform.' 72 The following proposed model code provides a uniform
right of performance by incorporating the elements of the state actions
most protective of performers' commercial interests. Concomitantly,
this proposal illustrates the weaknesses in existing state law theories.
V. PROPOSED MODEL CODE FOR RIGHTS OF PERFORMANCE
Section 1: The Right of Performance
One who takes a performance of a creator, or its by products, without
consent from and compensation to the creator, for any use in which the
public is involved, will be liable for damages and/or equitable relief re-
sulting from such use.
This section addresses the basic failure of state law to define pre-
cisely performers' rights in their original creations. It combines all of
the rights currently offered to performers by state laws. 173 Taken sepa-
rately, however, each state action in some way impedes the performer's
171. For an explanation of these intangible interests see notes 12-13 supra and accompanying
text.
172. See notes 66-71, 98-104, 131-35, 142-45 & 150 supra and accompanying text.
173. All the actions recognize a property interest. See notes 66-71, 90-97, 126-27 & 152-53
supra and accompanying text. The right of publicity compensates for takings of performance
byproducts. See notes 78 & 103-04 supra and accompanying text. Passing off contains the public
recognition element See notes 126-27 supra and accompanying text. Finally, misappropriation
contains the indirect competition element. See notes 154-64 supra and accompanying text. Addi-
tionally, in misappropriation the use need not be deceptive. See note 149 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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recovery for unauthorized appropriations. 174
The model code recognizes that any public use of the performance
commercially injures the creator. It is not limited to deceptive or con-
fusing uses as in "passing off.' 175 Moreover, it eliminates any direct
competition requirement that may hinder a performer's recovery.' 76 In
effect, this section of the code combines the elements of the right of
publicity 177 and misappropriation, 78 with the added requirement of
public recognition. Section 1 follows state law in refusing recovery for
injury to reputation alone.179 Nevertheless, if commercial loss results,
recovery is available.
Section 2: Definition of Performance
A protectible performance exists if the entertainer has transformed an
original idea into a concrete creation that is exhibited to the public in an
intangible form of expression and the public thereinafter associates that
concrete creation with the entertainer.
(1) The concrete creation is the expression of an original style, charac-
terization, or voice.
(2) The concrete creation, to be the property of the entertainer, must
result from the investment of time, effort, or money. If such concrete
creation occurs the entertainer has complete control over its use. It
may be subject to contract or assignment and is descendible.
(3) The byproducts of a performance are the values given the crea-
tor's name, likeness, and personality.
State law contains no identifiable definition of a protectible perform-
ance.180 The model code provides a workable definition that enables
performers to know what creations are protected. The code requires
expression of the idea in a creation. This is in conformity with the
generally recognized principle that there can be no monopoly of an
idea.18' The intangibility requirement in the code is necessary to avoid
copyright preemption.
82
Section 2 also includes the "passing off" requirement of secondary
174. See notes 73-76, 105-20, 131-35, 142 & 150 supra and accompanying text.
175. See notes 128-30 supra and accompanying text.
176. See notes 142-45 supra and accompanying text.
177. See notes 78-122 supra and accompanying text.
178. See notes 147-70 supra and accompanying text.
179. See note 13 supra.
180. See notes 4-11 supra and accompanying text.
181. See notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text.
182. See notes 29-38 supra and accompanying text.
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meaning.' 83 Public association of the performance with the performer
is necessary to prove the performers' commercial loss. Under this sec-
tion distinctive characters as well as concrete performances are
protected.
The code gives performers property rights in their creations analo-
gous to rights some state laws grant. 1 4 Under the code, however, the
right in the creation is fully descendible and assignable.1 85 Thus, the
performer has greater control over his creation.
Section 3: Infringement of the Right of Performance
(a) Imitation of a performance before a limited audience, not coupled
with a commercial loss to the creator, and without the intent to confuse
the public into thinking the imitator is the creator, is not an infringing
use.
(b) Any unauthorized, uncompensated use of the performance by an-
other entertainer, advertiser, or any other person, other than an imitation
defined in part (a) above, that detracts from the creator's ability to attract
audiences to the performance or decreases the ability to market the by-
products of the performance infringes the creators' right of performance.
Under this part it is unnecessary to show:
(A) direct competition between the creator and the other user of the
performance;
(B) actual deception or likelihood of confusion to the public because
of the unauthorized use.
Part (a) of this section is in conformity with case law denying recov-
ery for mere imitation.8 6 A performer can recover for imitation, how-
ever, if he shows commercial loss and public confusion. Recovery for
mere imitation would not compensate the performer for economic loss
and may in fact infringe upon the first amendment rights of another
performer. The code grants recovery when the imitation is used for
wrongful purposes.
In cases not involving imitation, the code does not require a showing
of public deception. Thus, any unconsented use imposing a commer-
cial loss upon a performer is actionable. This provision eliminates the
major problem in the "passing off" theory. 8 7 Moreover, the code's re-
183. See notes 126-27 supra and accompanying text.
184. See notes 66-71, 90-102, 126-27 & 152-53 supra and accompanying text.
185. California does not recognize the descendibility of the right. See notes 111-14 supra and
accompanying text.
186. See notes 9 & 131-34 supra and accompanying text.
187. See notes 128-34 pra and accompanying text.
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laxation of the direct competition requirement t"' gives performers
greater flexibility in recovering for unconsented appropriations.
Another improvement the code offers is its explanation of an infring-
ing commercial use. Although some state law theories remedy com-
mercial losses,' 89 none provides a precise description of an infringing
use. The code provides both performers and potential infringers with
guidelines for determining whether a particular use will infringe upon
the performers' rights. Moreover, because there is a lack of case law
concerning common-law copyright after the 1976 Act, the boundaries
of infringement are clarified.
Section 4: Burden of Proof
(a) To recover under this act the creator must prove:
(1) that the performance was the transformation of the creator's origi-
nal idea into a concrete creation;
(2) that he has not intentionally waived his rights in the performance;
(3) that another person has taken the performance without his con-
sent; and
(4) that he has suffered commercial losses as a result of the unauthor-
ized use of the performance.
(b) Any person charged with an infringement of the right of perform-
ance may defend by proving that the unauthorized use was in furtherance
of legitimate overriding first amendment rights.
Section 4 delineates the elimination of some of the state law barriers
to recovery for appropriations of performances. In resolving the ques-
tion of when a work is released into the public domain, the code states
that only a performer's intentional action will dedicate his creation to
the public. This clarifies the present ambiguity in common-law copy-
right. 90 Additionally, the requirement that the performance remain
intangible reduces the possibility that the federal Copyright Act will
preempt the cause of action if the rights protected are found to be
equivalent to copyright.' 9' Finally, the code gives a performance the
same protectible status as its byproducts. This conforms to the inclu-
sion of performances in the right of publicity enunciated in two recent
188. See notes 142-45 supra and accompanying text.
This code follows the misappropriation approach to competition. See notes 154-64 supra and
accompanying text.
189. See notes 71, 90-97, 103-04, 136-41 & 166-70 supra and accompanying text.
190. See notes 73-76 supra and accompanying text.
191. See notes 29-38 supra and accompanying text.
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cases. 192
Section 5: Relief for Infringement
(a) Upon satisfaction of the burden of proof the creator is entitled to
recover:
(I) Actual commercial damages to compensate for the injury caused
by the unauthorized use. The injury suffered must be either to the mar-
ketability of the performances' byproducts, the advertising value of the
creator's endorsement or the creator's ability to attract future audiences
to the performance.
(2) Equitable relief in the form of:
(A) injunctions to prevent the continued or future unauthorized use
of the performance, and
(B) an accounting to the creator for profits the creator lost because
of the unauthorized use.
(b) The creator's claim under this code will be given reciprocity in the
states enacting this code provided the creator has established that public
recognition of the performance crosses state boundaries.
This section provides for both legal and equitable relief for infringe-
ment of the right of performance. Although state law grants monetary
damages in entertainers' actions, 193 the cases are not explicit in indicat-
ing the performance's legal status. State actions for right of publicity
and misappropriation grant equitable injunctive relief to protect the en-
tertainer from further unauthorized exploitation. 94 Again, however
192. Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., No. 80-2310 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1981);
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). In some cases, however, the taking
of the performance must injure the marketability of the personality characteristics. Performers
can prove actual loss only from injury to the characteristics. See notes 103-05 supra and accompa-
nying text.
193. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977); Price v.
Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252,266 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
400 F. Supp. 836, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., Inc., [1957] 114 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 314, 321 (Pa. C.P.); CBS v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 725-26, 248
N.Y.S.2d 809, 812 (Sup. Ct. 1964). Cf. All v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(preliminary injunction granted because monetary damages difficult to measure). See also Lugosi
v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979); Munden v. Harris,
153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911); Redmond v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 277 N.Y. 707, 14
N.E.2d 636 (1938); Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941).
"[Common-law copyright will be protected by injunction and, once infringed, remedied by
general, special or even punitive damages." Gerety, RedVfning Privacy, 12 HARe. C.R.-C.L. REv.
233, 252 (1977). See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir.
1955); King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); CBS v. Documentaries
Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. CL 1964).
194. For cases on the right of publicity see Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 455 F. Supp.
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the reasons for granting equitable relief are unclear. Either the per-
former's right in the performance' 95 or the inadequacy of the legal rem-
edy are possible rationales.' 96  The injunctive relief does not
compensate for past commercial losses. The code permits a performer
to recover commercial losses and prevent continued unauthorized use
of the performance. Thus, it provides for an accounting and recognizes
the restitutionary theory of unjust enrichment.
The last provision in section 5 is a reciprocity section. An important
limitation of state protection of performances are state boundaries.
Thus, one state's protection of certain elements of a performance is no
guarantee that another state will provide the same protection. The
code provision eliminates this key restriction.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rights of entertainers in unrecorded live performances are inade-
quately protected. Performers are forced to rely on state law because
252, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Hal
Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836, 846-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d
813, 819, 603 P.2d 425, 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 326 (1979).
For cases involving misappropriation see Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338, 340 (E.D.N.C.
1939); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490, 494 (W.D. Pa. 1938);
Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 804, 101 N.Y.S.2d
483, 499-500 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aft'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951); Waring v. WDAS
Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 453, 194 A. 631, 641 (1937).
Courts also grant injunctions to enjoin passing off. See, e.g., Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App.
358, 269 P. 544 (1928). The court issued an injunction in this case because plaintiff had developed
his character so well that it had become synonymous in the public mind with him individually.
No alternative remedy would redress the harm to the plaintiff. Accord, Lahr v. Aden Chem. Co.,
300 F.2d 256 (Ist Cir. 1962). See generall, D. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 6.6 (1973).
195. See note 193 supra. In these cases courts have granted permanent and preliminary in-
junctive relief. When permanent relief is awarded, the performer's property right in his perform-
ance is more clearly established. This is because the appropriator is perpetually enjoined from
using the performer's work product without his consent, thus giving the performer a monopoly
over the performance. This enables him to control the dissemination of that performance and to
reap the financial rewards arising from such use.
The award of a preliminary injunction does not clearly establish a property right in the per-
formance. This is because the prerequisites for granting a preliminary injunction are likelihood of
success on the merits and the need to preserve the status quo in order to prevent irreparable
injury. This latter requirement exists when the remedy at law is inadequate. See Sonesta Int'l
Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973); Bonner v. Westbound Records,
49 Ill. App. 3d 543, 364 N.E.2d 570 (1977). The fact that the performer may succeed on the merits
or be irreparably harmed may have nothing to do with any property right that he has in his
performance.
196. See, eg., All v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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these creative works are outside the scope of the Copyright Act of 1976.
Because there is no unified right of performance under state law, per-
formers must rely on a variety of state actions for relief. No existing
theory, however, sufficiently protects performers' commercial and artis-
tic interests.
Society must recognize and protect performers' economic perform-
ance interests to promote further creative development of the perform-
ing arts. The proposed model code will guarantee this protection and
ensure continued vitality in the entertainment field.
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